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Abstract
Ensuring the accuracy of output of surgical robotics is vital, as an incision 
(during surgery) that is too deep could result in the death of the patient. A 
large contribution to the level of accuracy of components comes from its 
calibration. Calibration ensures the output is of high accuracy and is 
traceable to antecedent calibration units up to national standards. However, 
each of the levels in the calibration hierarchy have different security 
requirements (confidentiality and integrity), who may also be in conflict with 
each other. We propose a hybrid access control model for surgical robotics 
that maintains integrity and confidentiality requirements across a lattice 
structure and manages conflicts of interests.
2. The Calibration-Safety Access 
Control Problem
To maintain high accuracy for surgical robots we must maintain valid 
calibration. A calibration certificate is output, outlining information such as 
operating ranges and parent units.
Cyber attacks and invalid calibration (from parent units) can tamper with 
calibration status of robots.
 We must perform calibration on-the-fly to ensure robust operation 
and high level of accuracy.
To perform calibration on-the-fly, we must regulate access for calibrating 
components/units and requesting calibration certificates.
 Gaining access to calibration and certificates can leak information.
Multi-Level Integrity
 Integrity must be maintained for all robot components and 
corresponding calibration certificates – as well as parental units.
Multi-Level Confidentiality
 The calibration process and lookup operations (i.e. traceability) must 
not leak sensitive information.
Conflicts of Interest
 Conflicts of interest between calibration service providers and OEMs 
must be avoided.
Figure 2 – Access Control Model
3. Access Control Model
NMIs at the top level have the lowest confidentiality and highest integrity, 
while components at the hospital have highest confidentiality and lowest 
integrity requirements.
Information flow in the hierarchy is an instance of Sandhu’s observation [1] 
that BLP and BIBA are the same model.
 To enable the combination of BLP and BIBA, we must reverse BIBA.
 Lower levels can read from higher levels but not write and vice-versa.
Set of Integrity Labels
 A set of integrity labels is defined as Ω = {𝜔1, 𝜔2, … , 𝜔𝑞}, where each label 
corresponds to a unique integrity level.
Conflict of Interest Set
 A conflict of interest (COI) set is the set of subsets, where each 
corresponds to 𝑚𝑖 CSPs in conflict - 𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑖 = 𝑚1, 𝑚2, … ,𝑚𝑖
Security Label
 A security label is defined as a set of two n-sized vectors
𝑆 = 𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖2, … 𝑖𝑛 , 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛 ,
where 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑗 ∪ ⊥ ∪ 𝑇, 𝑝𝑗 ∈ Ω, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛.
4. Calibration Lifecycle
Initial Calibration (component birth)
 Imprint component with key pair at intermediate level
⊥,⊥, … , 𝑂𝐸𝑀𝑖 , … , ⊥ , [𝜔𝑗]
 Operator at 𝑇𝑃𝑗 can calibrate if no conflict with component 𝑂𝐸𝑀𝑖 and 
outputs certificate with label
⊥, ⊥, … , 𝑂𝐸𝑀𝑖 , … , 𝑇𝑃𝑗 , … , ⊥ , [𝜔𝑖]
Recalibration upon expiry
 Operator can calibrate if no COI and label dominates certificate
Other factors pertaining to calibration
• Parent units have invalid calibration or accuracy of component drifts 
within valid calibration period – parent units must be calibrated first
5. Future Work
 XACML requests directly embedded with capabilities and label 
evaluation within policies
 Calibration status of components (and their parents) can be learned 
over time, for consensus among other components in a robot to 
formulate access decisions
[1] Ravi S Sandhu. “Lattice-based access control models”. In: Computer 
11 (1993). pp. 9–19.
1. Introduction
Modern surgical robot systems provide higher accuracy and increased 
patient safety for surgical procedures compared to human surgery.
When Internet-connected, attacks on a surgical robot can affect its 
calibration status – impacting its accuracy. During a surgery, we must 
ensure surgical robots remain robust in the event of an attack, or other 
factors that result in invalid calibration.
To maintain a high accuracy we must have secure and reliable calibration. 
Reliable calibration is achieved through an unbroken chain of traceable 
calibration, involving multiple parties (Figure 1):
 Robot Operators (i.e. Surgeons)
 Manufacturers (OEMs)
 Calibration Service Providers (CSPs)
 National Measurement Institutes (NMIs) (i.e. NPL in UK and NIST in 
USA)
The collaboration of multiple parties that request certificates and perform 
calibration, particularly during on-the-fly calibration, motivates the need 
for a new multi-level mandatory, hybrid access control model for multi-
level integrity, confidentiality, and conflict management.
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Figure 1 – Calibration Hierarchy
